Begins the Logic [Books] of Brother Albert, O. P., when Bishop of Ratisbon
Book I: On the Universals
Tractate I: On the Antecedents to Logic
Chapter 1. Whether Logic is a Special Science?
In dealings [intendentibus] about logic, it is to be considered first what sort of science logic is and whether it is some part of philosophy, for what it is necessary and of what usefulness; then, moreover, what it is about and what its division [is], so that, with all parts of it possessed, it might be known when it is perfectly or imperfectly delivered or described. For about all these things the ancients seem to say diverse things. For certain of the ancients contended that logic is not any science, saying that that which is the method (modus) of every science or doctrine is not able to be science. But the method of every doctrine is logical, because everyone uses some genus of persuasion, who teaches or tries to advance (astruere) something; but every persuasion through speech is logical, whether the one who teaches or persuades uses syllogism or enthymeme or induction or example. Therefore the method of every doctrine is logical. And thus logical science is the method of every doctrine. Therefore there is not any special doctrine which should be called logical. On account of which both Aristotle in [book] II of his First Philosophy [i.e., Metaphysics] and similarly Averroes say that the method of every science is itself a science, which is and is called logical, and that a science and the method of a science [are] not able to be learned at the same time; but it is necessary first to learn the method of the science and then, through the method now perfectly comprehended, to try to further learn the science.
But they did not sufficiently consider that, although there are many sciences and each has a special method, which differs from the method of another, as also each science differs from another, yet there is one common method of every science through something common which is in every science. And this is that, through the investigation of reason from something known (cognito), is come “to knowledge of something unknown” (ad scientiam incogniti). For this happens in every science by whatever method the said science [uses], whether it is demonstrative or not demonstrative. And thanks to that common [thing], which is in every science, there is one common method of every science. And this method is to proceed through the act of reason, which is called ratiocination (ratiocinatio) or argumentation (argumentatio), from knowledge (cognitione) of something known into knowledge (scientiam) of that which was unknown, according to which Isaac in the book On Definitions, defining reason, says that “reason is” a power (virtus) of the intellectual soul “making a cause to run into the caused,” calling “cause” generally and broadly everything that according to intellect simpliciter or with respect to us antecedes as known (cognitum), through knowledge (cognitionem) of which by the leading of reason is come to awareness of the unknown (notitiam incogniti). But this method, although it is common because it is placed in every science, yet considered according to itself and not mixed with [other] sciences is something distinct per se from all others. And considered in this way this method is able to be a subject of science, and there is a special science concerning it. Nevertheless it is necessary that in that science the same method be observed, since nothing is able to be taught about the science of such method except by a logical method. For as Avicenna says, this method in a certain way has been set in all men by nature, insofar as they are intellectual. But what is in nature is imperfect, and is perfected through applied (adhibitam) art. For that which is in nature is seminal (seminarium) and imperfect and as if existing in potency. For from this that man is intellectual and “a spreading of intelligence” (intelligentiae stramentum) — in which intellectual forms are spread (sternuntur) in the act of the light of intelligence (in actu luminis intelligentiae) — and through understanding (intellectum) he is compositive of one form with another, through composition or division man becomes wondering (admirativus) of those things which he comprehends by receiving through sense and intellect or through intellect alone. But through this that he is wondering, he is put in suspense for inquiry (suspenditur ad inquisitionem); and through inquiry he compares one thing to another. But through comparison of one thing with another from that which is known (notum), he is led (deducitur) to knowledge of the unknown.
And thus this method of logic indeed begins from nature, but it advances into art and receives perfection in use and exercise; and Victorinus says well, that nature makes capable (habilem), art makes easy, but use makes powerful. For in this way from nature all arts and all sciences are advanced (profectae). And hence it is that “art imitates nature.” And as Homer says, some are perfect and good in such things through nature alone, some however not through nature, but because teachers of such things place [them] in [their] spirit (animo), and those placing such things in the spirit are made good through comprehension of the principles of art and science; some [are] so erroneous, that having nothing of such things in themselves neither are they able to receive from others, which Homer reckons useless for knowing the true and good.
It is clear therefore that there is one logic of special sciences, and as in a smith, in which there is a special art of fashioning a hammer, the use of which however is employed in all things which are fashioned by the smith-art. For investigation or reason investigating the unknown through the known is a certain special [doctrine/science/art], which has properties (passiones) and differences and parts and principles, which when they are proved of it [or “from it,” de ipso] a special art or science is effected, the use of which afterwards is applied to all sciences. In this way therefore it is clear that logic spoken generally is a special science, about which it is now to be treated.
Notes
Latin text from the Cologne edition: https://institutionen.erzbistum-koeln.de/export/sites/institutionen/albertus-magnus-institut/.content/.galleries/downloads/AMOO_1.1A26_Ed.-Santos-Noya_2004_gs.pdf.
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