One of the first things St. Albertus Magnus does in his treatise De Intellectu et Intelligibili is argue that there is a “first intellect” or “first knower” that is the cause of all cognitive beings. I translate the entire chapter where the argument is presented here:
De Intellectu et Intelligibili: Book I, Tractate I, Chapter 2: In which it is demonstrated that everything cognitive among animals is caused by something else cognitive.
We say therefore that every nature which has some power of cognizing has that power of cognition either from itself or from some other nature which is before it. But it is clear that it does not have it from itself; for then it would be the principle of cognition in all others and its cognitive power would not be imperfect, but perfect, nor would it be passive, but active — but that all these things do not convene to the souls of animals is clear from what is determined in the book De anima.
If however someone should perhaps say that the soul of animals has its cognitive power from itself, because its power of cognition is in its nature — as a triangle has from itself to possess three [angles] equal to two right [angles], and yet not on account of this is it a principle causing something in others — we will say that “to have from itself” is said in two ways: in one way according to efficient cause and in another way according to formal cause. Now we here inquire about the cognitive from itself according to each cause at once, as in physics the first mover is motive from itself not only since it does not have before itself an efficient cause of its motion, but also since it is in its nature and essence to move, on account of which also every moved mover (omne quod movet motum) has a motive power from it, and by its motive power is fontally flowing forth (fontaliter effluens) all motive powers into all other movers. For by thus inquiring whether the soul of animals is cognitive from itself there necessarily follow the things that were previously introduced.
Now since everything caused in more ignoble matter necessarily falls short (deficiat) from its first cause, the weakness (defectus) of cognition which is in the cognitive power of the soul of animals shows that not only does it have its cognitive power from something else, but also that it is very distant from that which is the first cause and fount of cognition. Therefore it is necessary to be said that it has [its cognitive power] from something else that is first and perfectly cognitive of all [1]. For if it were said to have [its cognitive power] from another not first and perfect, there would be the same question about that, and it would [either] go into infinity or into a first and perfect cognitive being.
Further, everything cognitive among mortal animals is the same in genus with everything cognitive among mortal [animals]. Or, if it should be said through the prior and posterior [2], nevertheless this will be with respect to one thing. But whatever things have such likeness and unity of genus or nature issue (exeunt) from some one thing that is the cause of that likeness in all. Therefore it is necessary that something cognitive among animals is caused by some one first cognitive being according to [both] efficient and formal cause at once.
If however someone should say that this is not concluded except about things caused univocally, as “man generates man,” but cognitive things do not have a cause univocal in genus but [only] equivocal, we will convince the adversary of truth through this, that everything equivocal is reduced to something univocal that is before it. Therefore this generating [cause], that speaks something equivocal, has before itself something univocal that is the first cause of this, and thus we will return to the same thing that was concluded before.
Further, we see it to be thus in all things that whenever some powers and forms are found in many things and in some of them they are imperfect, but in some perfect, the imperfect are caused by the perfect and the imperfection happens from the diversity and imperfection of matter. Therefore it is accordingly necessary that it happens similarly in cognitive natures. Therefore the nature by which cognitive animals are caused will be from some first and perfect cognitive nature.
But this whole disputation is drawn from a certain letter of Aristotle which he writes about the principle of the universe, of which Avicenna makes mention in his Metaphysics. And also Eustratius [in his commentary] on Nicomachean Ethics VI says that every cognition of animals flows forth from a first cognitive nature.
Some comments/notes:
Many of the principles and moves here will be very familiar to readers of scholastic thought. I’m pretty sure I’ve read basically the same sort of argument for a First Intellect somewhere in St. Thomas, but can’t recall the place off the top of my head.
I’m particularly interested in the moves made in the second paragraph, where St. Albert appeals to both efficient and formal causation. In the background is his metaphysics of emanation/flux, which underlies and suffuses the entirety of his thought.
[1]. This could be either “first and perfectly cognitive of all things,” or “of all things first and perfectly cognitive”.
[2]. “Through the prior and posterior” is a technical phrase in medieval philosophy referring to a kind of analogical predication. Cf. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analogy-medieval/#pagetopright.
This is translated from a preliminary version of the Cologne edition of the text edited by Silvia Donati and, as part of a special research program funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, made freely available online through the Albertus Magnus Institut website: https://www.albertus-magnus-institut.de
Disputed Questions 
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