The Summa de Anima of the Teacher Brother Johannes de Rupella [John of la Rochelle]
Prologue
“If thou know not thyself, O fairest among women, go forth, and follow after the steps of the flocks” etc. [Cant. 1:7]. This word is proposed to you, rational soul, you who are the fairest (pulcherrima) of women, since [you are] the most splendid (speciosissima) of all creatures, holding the highest image and likeness of beauty (pulchritudinis) and grace (decoris). If you are ignorant of this your beauty, you are compared to the irrational flocks: hence go forth, and follow after the steps of the flocks. Therefore, soul, you should consider three things about yourself: namely, your substance, [your] power (virtus) and operation, [and those things] in which consists your wonderful beauty. Give to me, therefore, most loving Jesus, wisdom, that sitteth by thy throne and cast me not off [Wisd. 9:4]; but give to me wisdom which may be with me, and may labour with me [Wisd. 9:10], [and] may teach and instruct [me] considering, unveiling (revelans) my eyes: and I will consider the wondrous things of [Ps. 118:18] my soul.
The First Consideration on the Soul according to Substance
I. Whether there is a soul
The first consideration is on the substance of the soul, the second on [its] virtue and operation. But the consideration on the substance of the soul is multiplied: for first is to be asked whether there is a soul, second what it is.
Chapter 1: That there is a soul
In the first place, therefore, with Jesus Christ helping, it is to be shown in this way that [the soul] exists, so that it never happens that one doubts about it, whether it exists. Since we see certain bodies which never take nutrients (nutriuntur), nor grow (augmentantur), nor reproduce (generant), nor are moved by voluntary motion, as a stone; and we see other bodies which take nutrients, grow, and generate things like themselves, as plants; and we see others which sense (sentiunt) and are moved voluntarily; it remains that in the essence of those [that sense and are moved voluntarily] there is a principle of those actions besides corporeity. Since if their principle were corporeity, then it would be found in all bodies. Since, therefore, that [principle], from which those actions emanate, is called by all the soul: therefore there is a soul. Furthermore, we see actions in which vegetables and animals and humans agree (conveniunt), as to take nutrients and reproduce; and actions in which only animals — or many of them — and humans agree, in which vegetables do not agree, as to sense, to imagine, and to be moved voluntarily; and actions which are properly of humans, as to reason (ratiocinari), to understand, to discern between true and false and good and evil, to invent arts, and to take counsel and to choose freely. Therefore there will be in vegetables a principle of nutrition and generation, which principle indeed we call the vegetable soul; in animals a principle of sensing, imagining, and moving according to appetite, which is called the sensible soul; then in humans a principle of reasoning and understanding etc., which is called the rational soul. Therefore there is a vegetable and sensible and rational soul.
For this [conclusion] the reason of Avicenna is such: on the supposition that there was a man suddenly created fully formed (perfectus) and with his sight veiled, he would not see exterior things; and were he created such that the thickness of air would not touch him which he would be able to feel, and [he was created] thus [that his] members were disconnected and not assembled to him, nor were they touching (contingerent) [him] — it is evident that, a man established thus, thinking about himself, he would not doubt to affirm that he exists, yet he would not affirm the exteriors of his members, or the hidden things of his interiors as the brain and others. Rather, if it would be possible for him to imagine a hand or another member, he would not imagine that that member [is] his, nor [that it is] necessary to his essence. Since therefore everything which is affirmed is different from that which is not affirmed, and what is conceded is different from that which is not conceded; but the essence which [the man] affirms [of himself] is proper to him because it is his very self, yet it is beyond his body, which he does not affirm [of himself]. Therefore aroused from the state of that kind, he has a way of watching (evigilandi) and knowing that the being (esse) of the soul is different from the being of the body [1].
Also, [Psuedo-]Augustine [says] in the book De anima et spiritu: “The mind or soul knows nothing so much as that which is present to itself; nor is anything more present to the mind, nor to the soul, than it is to itself. Therefore it knows nothing so much as itself — for it is aware that itself lives, itself remembers, wishes, is aware (cognoscere), knows (scire), judges; and these all it knows most certainly about itself.” It is impossible therefore that it is ignorant that itself exists.
Also [Pseudo-Augustine says]: “When the mind or soul seeks what the mind or soul is, it knows assuredly that it seeks itself; and it knows that it is the mind or soul which seeks its very self; nor does it seek something other of itself, than itself. Since therefore it knows itself seeking, it certainly knows that itself exists.”
Notes
Scripture translations are from the Douay-Rheims Challoner.
[1]. This paragraph is a summary of Avicenna’s famous “flying man” thought experiment.
Disputed Questions 
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